Abstract: Today, web browsers are a major avenue for cyber-compromise and data breaches. Web browser hardening, through highgranularity and tailored configurations, can help prevent or mitigate many of these attack avenues. For example, an enforced configuration that allows users to use one browser to connect to critical and trusted websites and a different browser for untrusted websites, with the former web browser restricted to trusted sites and the latter with JavaScript and Plugins disabled by default, can help prevent JavaScript-and Plugin-based attacks. However, most organizations today, still allow web browsers to run with their default configurations and allow users to use the same web browser to connect to trusted and untrusted websites alike. In this tutorial article, we describe in detail the steps needed for hardening the enterprise browser ecosystem using such tailored and highgranularity hardening approach at the enterprise scale by using the Windows Group Policy Editor and Active Directory Services, which are in widespread use in most organizations. We hope that system administrators use this guide to jump-start an enterprisewide strategy for implementing high-granularity application-level hardening. This will help secure enterprise systems at the clientside, in addition to the network perimeter and server-side.
INTRODUCTION
Today, due to the flexibility and economic advantages offered by web technologies, organizations are moving legacy information technology systems, and in some cases operational technology systems toward web technologies at a rapid pace. Most cloud-based services also use web browsers for client and administrative access. This wide and rapid migration has resulted in web browsers being used today for accessing critical and private enterprise data and systems. This, while at the same time, synchronously or asynchronously, the same web browser is being used to access untrusted sites and browse the Web at large.
Modern web browsers implement full virtual execution with respect to Turing completeness [1] . This functionality is one of the major reasons for their success. However, it also allows attackers to remotely execute code of their choice by simply motivating the user to perform one click. In other words, under the current usage and configuration scenario, one click is the only-thing that separates a trusted and critical application from the rest of the untrusted Web. Browsing ecosystems configured in this manner, or not configured at all, violate at least two of Saltzer & Schroeder's [2] secure design principles: Least Privilege and Fail-safe Defaults.
A. The Problem and Threat Model
The problem results from the combination of: (a) the widespread and shared usage of web-browsers, (b) their compute, storage, and networking functionality, and (c) their default permissive security configurations. This creates a very vulnerable browsing ecosystem. Under these usage and configuration conditions, attackers have direct and remote access to the same client web browser that is used to access critical enterprise sites. This web browser is usually the user's, and sometimes system administrator's preferred web browser. Attacks in such environment can be accomplished by malicious actors through a simple web drive-by, phishing, or any other uniform resource locator (URL) sharing method that can lead users to a malicious website. Under these current usage and configuration patterns, it should not be surprising that many of today's attacks begin with the Web Browser. Also, it should not be surprising that attacks through the Web Browser are very common and successful at high rates. According to Verizon's 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report [3] , the Web App Attacks pattern was used in 40% of the reported data breaches in 2015 (908 breaches with n=2,260); Though, the same pattern accounted for less than 10% of the reported incidents (5,334 incidents with n=64,199) [3] . For incidents and breaches in 2016, according to Verizon's 2017 Data Breach Investigations Report [4] , the Web App Attacks pattern was used in about 30% of the reported data breaches (571 breaches with n=1,935); Though, the same pattern accounted for about 15% of the reported incidents (6,502 incidents with n=42,068) [3] p. 38.
This data indicates that the Web App Attacks pattern, during the last two years, has resulted in a high likeliness of breach. To further back up these assertions, we point out that in a presentation given at the USENIX Enigma 2016 Conference, Mr. Rob Joyce, Chief of the Tailored Access Operations Office at the U.S. National Security Agency, pointed out that today, most intrusions are carried out through one of these three initial vectors: 1) email (including phishing), 2) malicious website, and 3) malicious removable media [5] .
Current security practices such as edge firewalls, network security perimeters, and network segmentation are not enough to adequately combat these Trojan horselike attack avenues. Even the highest levels of perimeter security and server-side hardening cannot adequately protect against phishing attacks, when the same web browser is being used to access critical services and browsing the Web at-large. The inadequacy is especially true when the same set of permissive security configurations are used for all sites, trusted and untrusted.
As a result, the web browser is, unarguably, the weakest link on the enterprise today. However, most well-known and commonly used desktop web browser applications are designed and developed by teams with cybersecurity expertise and using secure development best-practices. These applications are also updated on a continuous basis. Though, the browser applications themselves may have a few vulnerabilities, the major problem currently resides not on application binary code but on application configuration. Most organizations today use a one-size-fits-all approach to application configuration. Also, most organizations allow browsers to be run with their permissive default configurations, which were not created for enterprise-level security. To solve this problem, we need an approach in which organizations tailor configurations of web browsers, and other applications, in a way that implements the principle of least privilege, to its maximum extent possible. The problem described in the previous section needs to be addressed today. To that end, we describe a step-bystep walkthrough that can be used, today, by system administrators to harden the web browser client infrastructure in the enterprise.
B. The Contributions of This Article
The security policy used as a case study in this article enforces least privilege for Internet versus Intranet web applications. In this policy, two browsers, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge will be configured to enable all browser functionality, but for trusted Intranet sites only. A second browser, Google Chrome, will be configured with high security configurations to enable safer browsing of the Web at large, without having to continuously update and manage a website white-list. In this article, all steps needed to implement this browser hardening policy are described for an organization that uses Microsoft's ADDS and Group Policy. Figure 1 represents a flowchart of this article's contributions. We do not discuss about Mozilla Firefox in this article because Firefox has no native support for Group Policy Object (GPO) configurations.
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This article is an expanded version of a published conference paper [6] . The additional contributions of this article are as follows: 1) added a case study for describing a set of web browser hardening policies (Section 2); 2) added Microsoft Edge as one of the web browsers being configured (Sub-Section 5-B3); 3) expanded the background section by expanding explanations of Active Directory Domain Services, Group Policy Objects and Management, and Environment Setup (Sub-Sections 3-A, 3-B, & 3-C); 4) added the related work section (Section 6); 5) added new figures and flowcharts to better explain the contributions of this article (Figures 1, 2, 3 
C. The Outline of This Article
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the hardening policy target of this tutorial. In Section 3 we introduce the terminology and tools needed for remote application configuration in Windows. In Section 4 we describe the process of implementing an organization's hierarchical structure into an Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS) hierarchy. In Section 5 we detail all the steps needed to implement the proposed web browser hardening policy. In Section 6 we briefly describe related research work. We present our conclusion in Section 8. A complete list of abbreviations, acknowledgments, and references is provided at the end.
WEB BROWSERS HARDENING POLICY CASE STUDY
The web browser hardening policy that we use as a case study in this article is described here. Other, multiple-application policies may be deployed using the steps described in this article. http://journals.uob.edu.bh
Currently, there are no configuration options for Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge, and Google Chrome that would block access to a list of websites (as of 05/20/2018). As such, in this article, we describe how to block JavaScript and Plugin functionality for untrusted sites. In the future, we intend to expand this work to include firewall configurations.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the services, concepts, and nomenclature needed to understand Microsoft's Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS) and be able to remotely manage Windows-based users and computers in an enterprise. This knowledge is necessary to design and remotely implement configurations on Web Browsers within managed Windows clients.
A. Active Directory Domain Services
Active Directory (AD) is Microsoft's brand name for a suite of remote administration and configuration tools. AD includes directory, identity, and remote configuration services. A Windows Server that is used to remotely control and configure a group of Microsoft Windows clients is called a Domain Controller. When AD services are added, as a server role, the term Active Directory Domain Services is used (ADDS) [7] . ADDS enables administrators to organize enterprise assets and configurations using a five-level hierarchy. The root of the structure is called an AD Forest because multiple AD Servers act as peers for fault tolerance. At the second level are Domain Controllers (Windows ADDS Servers). Multiple Domain Controllers can manage and replicate the organization's directory(ies) and user and device configurations, in whole or in part, and in a distributed and fault-tolerant fashion. Within this level, we have domains, which are the major grouping entity within the ADDS model. At the third level are Organizational Units (OUs). At the fourth-level are Users and Computers which are attached to OUs, these are the managed assets. At the fifth level are configuration options and their respective values, which in ADDS are called Group Policy Objects (GPOs). These are applied to whole OUs using a sequential priority. This way, a given set of configurations, the GPO Objects, can be remotely enforced in all Users and Computers within an Organizational Unit. In ADDS the height of the hierarchy is fixed.
B. Group Policy Objects and Management
Group Policy Objects (GPOs) is a term to define sets of configuration settings and their corresponding configuration values. In the ADDS model, configurations and their values must be copied within each OU to be applied to the OU or they can be applied to the whole domain instead, by attaching all the OUs to a domain and creating a GPO list linked to the domain (more information on this process in Subsection 4-C). The Group Policy Management Console [8] is the tool used to create and edit GPOs based on available configuration templates called Administrative Templates. These templates are stored in ADMX/ADML [9] files.
In Windows clients, usually at client boot time, the server side ADDS software communicates with the client-side Group Policy software through the IP Network. Up to 20 different ports and 40 different network protocols are used for all ADDS services and about 5 of each for Group Policy [10] . Then the clientside software uses the received Group Policy information to populate Windows Registry keys and their corresponding values. This is what makes the configurations effective. Only systems and applications that support configuration through Microsoft's Group Policy, and that use the Windows Registry for application configuration, can be configured this way. Internet Explorer has extensive support for GPO. Google Chrome has very good support. Microsoft Edge currently supports a limited set of configuration options, though support for additional configuration options is expected to increase. Mozilla Firefox has no native support for GPO configurations nor it uses the Windows Registry for most local configurations, instead it uses a local configuration file. There exists a third-party add-on, known as 'GPO For Firefox' [11] , to enable Firefox's configuration via group policy. However, the add-on is outdated and incompatible with latest version of Firefox (as of 05/20/2018).
C. Environment Setup
For the purposes of this tutorial we assume that the reader has access to an ADDS testing infrastructure that includes at least one Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS) Server and at least two managed Windows clients. In a previously published open-access cyber-security tutorial [12] , we describe a step-by-step guide for setting up an ADDS server, and the process of assigning a domain controller to a domain network. We direct the readers to read through this tutorial if they would like guidance on how to setup an ADDS network and assigning a domain controller to the network.
The activities described in this tutorial were performed on a single workstation, using three virtual machines (VMs): One Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 64-bit Build 14393 with ADDS role VM; and Two Windows 10 Education edition VMs, referred as Clients or Client1 and Client2 and attached to the ADDS Server.
CREATING AN ADDS STRUCTURE FOR THE

ORGANIZATION
In this section we describe how to map the structure of an organization into an ADDS tree, that can be used to remotely apply configurations to a selected group of users or computers contained within an organizational http://journals.uob.edu.bh unit (OU). Figure 3 represents a flowchart of the steps involved in this section. In ADDS an organization's departmental layout must be translated into groups called Organizational Units (OUs). However, in ADDS OUs cannot be nested. In other words, an OU cannot be the parent of another OU. If an organization has a deeper hierarchical structure such as Campus: College: Department: ... these sub-structures must be flattened. The lowest or leaf-level in ADDS is users or computers, both which can be attached to one and only one organizational unit (OU).
To summarize the process, the following four steps are required for the translation: (1) Create OUs as necessary, (2) Attach users/computers to respective OU, (3) Create GPO lists, and (4) Link respective GPO list to the relevant OU, as per organizational policy requirement. Figures 4 and 5 represent an example organizational structure and a corresponding ADDS structure. Figure 6 represents Figure 5 in the GUI of Group Policy Management interface. Next, we describe how to create an OU in ADDS.
A. Setting up Organizational Units
Here we detail the steps needed to create an organizational unit in ADDS.
1 Management interface box, identify the target forest and subsequently, the target domain. 5. Right-click on the target domain name and in the pop-up menu, select New Organizational Unit. In the subsequent dialogue-box, type-in the intended name of the OU to be created. 6. As a result, the OU is created. To verify this creation, one can find the new OU within the domain tree ( Figure 7) .
B. Attaching Users and Computers to OUs
Once an OU is created, objects (groups of users and/or computers) can be attached to the organizational unit. Here, we detail the steps to attach objects (users or computers) to an OU. 4 . In this interface box, search for the target domain name tree, on the left pane of the interface box. Once identified, expand the target domain name tree. 5. Under the target domain name tree, identify the target object, which would be stored in its' respective folder. For example, if the target object is a user named Joe, it can be found in the Users folder. 6. Once the target object has been identified, rightclick on the object to activate a menu pop-up. In this menu, select the item Move.... In the subsequent Move popup box, select the desired 7. OU as the destination to move the object to, then click OK. 8. The target object has now been successfully attached to the desired OU. To verify, in the Active Directory Users and Computers interface box, search for the target domain name tree, on the left pane of the interface box. Once identified, expand the target domain name tree. 9. Under the target domain name tree, search for the desired OU folder. Click on it. Press the F5 key on the keyboard or click on the Refresh icon in the top tool-bar. If the target object is visible in the center pane of the desired OU, we can consider the attachment to be verified.
C. Creating a GPO and linking it to a desired OU
Once an Organizational Unit (OU) is created, and once all the desired individual users or groups of users and computers have been attached to the OU, we can now create and apply a set of configurations to all entities within the OU. To do this, we must first create a Group Policy Object (GPO) and link it to the target OU. Here, we detail the steps to create a GPO and link it to the desired OU.
1. In the Group Policy Management interface box, identify the target OU. Once found, rightclick on it. linked; it will be shown under the designated entity, which can either an OU (as shown in Figure 7 ) or a domain itself.
HARDENING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STEPS
Once the organizational hierarchy is translated into ADDS, as discussed in Section 4, we can edit the GPO list settings for the respective OUs to change configuration of domain system applications. In this section, we will go through the process of remotely hardening web browsers (more information on web browser selection in SubSection 3-B), by changing group policy settings.
This section also explains how Administrative Templates (ADML/ADMX/ADM) files can be imported into the Group Policy Management Console. Group Policies for Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge are not available on vanilla installations of Windows Server 2016. We need to download the corresponding administrative template packages and import them to incorporate Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge Group Policies. This section also describes how to accomplish such an import action. Figure 8 represents a flowchart of the steps involved in this section. To make it easier for readers to use this article as a tutorial, we will go through all the steps for remotely hardening each web browser in a separate subsection.
A. Hardening Steps for Internet Explorer 1) Configuration Template Location for Internet Explorer:
Within the group management tree structure, the default location of web browser's policy settings, for domain users, are as follows:
1. In the Group Policy Management dialog box, identify the target GPO list. Once found, right-click on it. In the resultant pop-up menu, click Edit....
In the Group Policy Management Edit
dialog, locate the User Configuration tree (Figure 9 ), which can be found in the left pane of the interface. Once located, expand the A directory browser will pop-up. Navigate/browse to the location of the Google Chrome installer. Select the installer and click on the Open button. 7. Subsequently, the Deploy Software dialogue box will pop-up. The default selection in this box should be Assigned radio button. If not, change it to Assigned and click on OK. 8. All systems connected to the domain will run the installer upon restart or log-on of domain users. Alternatively, a system administrator can also right-click on a target OU and in the resultant pop-up menu, select Group Policy 
3) Configuration Template Location for Google Chrome:
The steps 1-2 are same as stated for Internet Explorer in (5-A1).
3. In the subsequent expanded tree view, a tree with name of Administrative Templates should be visible. Expand it. In the subsequent expanded tree view, another tree with the name of Classic Administrative Templates (ADM) should be visible. Expand it. 4. In the subsequent tree view, a folder named Google should be visible; Expand it. Resultantly, there should be two folders visible, with the names Google Chrome and Google Chrome -Default Settings (users can override).
For this tutorial, we will be focusing on
Google Chrome folder settings, so that users In the resultant box, as seen in Figure 10 , select the radio button Enabled. Then click OK. This policy setting will disable third party cookies across all we domains.
PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The contribution presented in this article leads to the following theoretical and practical implications.
A. Theoretical Implications
The perimeter-based security or walled-castle approach, which has been applied towards protecting the enterprise, has been successful at preventing most cyberattacks that are launched from the outside. Today, from an attacker's point-of-view, the path of least resistance is tricking users to launch an attack from within the security perimeter. The walled-castle approach to cyber-defense is necessary, but no longer sufficient in securing an organization's data and infrastructure. Time has come to secure the enterprise at the role-, user-, device-, and application-levels. This can be accomplished through high-granularity and tailored security configurations. Today, the weakest and highest targeted applications are email and internet browsers. For this reason, we have prioritized developing techniques and tools for securing the client browser ecosystem.
We argue that this implication also applies to all applications being utilized in an enterprise, not just web browsers. This realization helped shape our understanding of this project's current and future practical implications.
B. Practical Implications
Currently, high-granularity and tailored security configurations may be performed manually across some enterprise applications. A detailed process for the manual configuration approach needed for hardening web browsers in the enterprise is the main contribution of this article. However, the efficiency, sustainability, scalability, and accuracy of such hardening processes is being heavily compromised by the lack of automated and policy-based design and deployment technologies and tools.
To tackle this challenge, we are currently working on developing a tool-set to help system administrators design, and automatically deploy, secure application configuration policies at an enterprise scale. This tool-set is called HiFiPol:Browser and is policy-based and independent of the platform, application, device, user, and role aspects of an organization. Additional information on the HiFiPol:Browser project may be found in Section 7 of this article.
RELATED CONTRIBUTIONS
In previous publications [24] , [25] , [26] , we describe a prototype system, HiFiPol:Browser, for policy-based and enterprise-scale system hardening. With HiFiPol:Browser, system administrators can use a highlevel, English-like specification language to represent their organizational infrastructure and security policies.
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This specification language is called HERMES and it is independent of platforms, applications, users, roles, and devices being configured. HiFiPol:Browser uses HERMES policy specifications to remotely configure client-side applications as per the specifications provided in the policies.. HiFiPol:Browser is in an early prototype stage and we expect that it will be several years before the system is ready for commercial enterprise deployment. Hence, we decided to put forth the contribution in this article hoping that, with the current tools, organizations can still deploy, today, a hardened browser infrastructure, even if at a higher configuration and maintenance cost than when compared with automated policy-level tools, which we are currently working on designing and developing.
RELATED REMOTE CONFIGURATION RESOURCES
There are several online articles, which detail how to setup and use ADDS. We have written a step-by-step tutorial about the setup process of an ADDS domain and assigning a controller to the domain [12] . Microsoft has published multiple articles which guide deployment, operations, and troubleshooting of ADDS infrastructure [16] , [17] . There are also several books and online articles which explain the process of managing an organization's systems using Group Policies. Jeremy Moskowitz has authored a book, which explains in detail, all processes involved in using group policy tools including administrative templates [18] . Microsoft has also published a beginner's overview tutorial for Group Policy Management tool [19] .
There are also many articles describing how to change a given configuration option for a given webbrowser, using group policies in an ADDS infrastructure. Google has published multiple and detailed guides, which describe about: a) ADDS-based enterprise-level remote deployment of Google Chrome [20] , and b) setting Google Chrome group policies for devices, and users [21] . Similarly, Microsoft has also published brief group policy setting guides for both Internet Explorer [22] and Microsoft Edge [23] .
However, we did not find a standalone step-by-step tutorial, that would guide a system administrator through the process of instantiating a high-level security policy that spans multiple applications, into the corresponding security configurations. Currently to do this, a system administrator must: a) read all the existing tutorials, b) assemble all the pieces of knowledge together, and c) fillin the gaps between knowledge pieces by conducting research. In this article, we present a standalone step-bystep tutorial that details the process of instantiating a multi-application high-level security policy into corresponding security configurations. We do this with the use of a case study which implements least privilege web browsing policy.
CONCLUSION
In this tutorial article, we described, step-by-step, how to use Microsoft's Active Directory Domain Services and Group Policy to remotely configure Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge, and Google Chrome to implement a specific Least Privilege security policy. In such policy, a hardened browser (Google Chrome) is dedicated to browsing the Web at-large, and a second browser (Internet Explorer or Microsoft Edge) is restricted to accessing Intranet sites. ADDS is the Stateof-the-Practice and the most widely-used system in the enterprise for configuring and managing Windows-based clients. We hope that, by following and adapting this tutorial, organizations begin to configure their client browsing infrastructure with hardened configurations that implement a least privilege policy. We believe that hardening browsers, in addition to the network and server sides, will help prevent and mitigate the current prevalence of browser-based cyber-attacks.
FUTURE WORK
The research problem of automatic and remote deployment of configurations through high-level security policy involves the following steps: 1) generalizing the enforcement of security policies, 2) automating the process of enforcing and compliance check, 3) verifying the enforcement/compliance of security policies, and 4) evaluating the effectiveness of this method via experimental studies. To be specific, the research problem requires fulfilling the following contributions:
1. Present the complexity of high-level policy enforcement in web browsers, by explaining the inefficiency of current tools in enforcing highlevel policies. Demonstrate in a step-by-step manner on how to enforce a high-level policy in web browsers using current tools, instead of waiting for the development of a new tool. (This is the contribution that we are reporting about in the submitted manuscript). 2. Architecture design of a tool for policy enforcement; (We designed a tool called HiFiPol:Browser and reported about it in a conference publication [25] 
